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September 16, 2006

"From Xena Warrior Princess to Joan of Arc"

Just collecting some more links.

From the testimony of Lt. Col. Tony Shaffer:

(U) Last but by no means least, Dr. Eileen Preisser, the brilliant double PhD who’s understanding of both cutting edge technology and human factors/neural networking served as the intellectual “glue” that put together the suite of technology and analysts that perform the astounding feat of identifying Atta and other pre-9-11 terrorist events....

(U) Jun 2000. At the request of SOCOM ([ ], DIA’s Rep to SOCOM), with the permission of the DIA/DO leadership, I approach MG Noonan, Commander of Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) to request that Dr. Eileen Preisser be attached to my unit, STRATUS IVY so that she could continue to support ABLE DANGER. This request is denied – I am told later, privately, that MG Noonan felt that by trying to take Dr. Preisser that I was trying to “steal his capability”....

(U) Late September 2001. Eileen Preisser calls me for coffee and tells me she has something she needs to show me. At coffee she shows me a chart she had brought with her – a large desk top size chart. On it she has me look at the ‘Brooklyn Cell’ – I was confused at first – but she kept telling me to look – and in the “cluster” I eventually found the picture of Atta. She pointed out (and I recognized) that this was one of the charts I LIWA had produced in Jan 2000, and had a sinking feeling at the pit of my stomach – I felt that we had been on the right track – and that because of the bureaucracy we had been stopped – and that we might well have been able to have done something to stop the 9/11 attack. I ask Eileen what she plans to do with the information/chart – she tells me that she does not know but she plans to do something.

(U) Last week of September 2001. I am on my normal afternoon run from the Pentagon to the Lincoln Memorial – and I receive a call from Dr. Preisser. She tells me “you’ll never guess where I am” – she tells me about sitting in the outer office of Scooter Libby and the fact that she, Congressman Curt Weldon, Congressman Chris Shays and Congressman Dan Burton are going in to brief Steven Hadley on the Atta chart. I am both amazed and satisfied that the Atta information and our work on ABLE DANGER had been provided to proper government leadership and fully expected that the ABLE DANGER team might even be reconstituted. It was not.

(U) Nov 2001-July 2003 – I accept recall to active duty as a Major in the Army and command a Defense HUMINT unit named Field Operating Base (FOB) Alpha. During this period I attempted to work with ASD/SOLIC to resurrect ABLE DANGER as part of FOB Alpha’s mission. When some sensitive information relating SOLIC was leaked to the press the effort to bring back ABLE DANGER was also terminated. Dr. Preisser was involved in this attempt to resurrect the project.

From the testimony of Erik Kleinsmith:

From March of 1999 until February of 2001, I was an active duty Army Major and the Chief of Intelligence of what was then called the Land Information Warfare Activity or LIWA. My branch provided analytical support to Army Information Operations, but because of the data mining capabilities we possessed in the Information Dominance Center, we routinely provided direct analytical support to several combatant commands as well as other customers. One of our most prominent operations was in support of the data mining proof of concept demonstration for the Assistant Security of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence or ASD-C3I. Called the JCAG project, it demonstrated how data mining and intelligence analysis could be conducted in a counterintelligence and technology protection capacity. That project ran throughout the later half of 1999 and our results were ultimately subpoenaed by Congressman Dan Burton's office through the House Reform Committee on November 16th, 1999.

In December of 1999 we were approached by US Special Operations Command to support Able Danger. I assigned the same core team of analysts that worked the JCAG project, and with Dr. Eileen Preisser as the analytical lead, four of us conducted data mining and analysis of the Al Qaeda terrorist network coordinating with SOCOM and other organizations throughout that time. In the months that followed, we were able collect an immense amount of data for analysis that allowed us to map Al Qaeda as a world-wide threat with a surprisingly significant presence within the United States.

In approximately April of 2000 our support to Able Danger became severely restricted and ultimately shut down due to intelligence oversight concerns. Supported vigorously by the LIWA and INSCOM chains of command, we actively worked to overcome this shut down for the next several months. In the midst of this shut down, I along with CW3 Terri Stephens were forced to destroy all the data, charts, and other analytical products that we had not already passed on to SOCOM related to Able Danger. This destruction was dictated by, and conducted in accordance with intelligence oversight procedures.

Ultimately, we were able to restart our support to SOCOM at the end of September 2000. Additionally, the bombing of the USS Cole on October 12th brought USCENTCOM to the IDC, who then became our primary customer until my departure from active duty on April 1st 2001.

From the later testimony of Erik Kleinsmith:

Because of our abilities, our support was routinely requested by several customers that took our work far outside our normal mission of supporting Army information operations. In the two years that I was Chief of Intelligence, we provided analytical support to every Combatant Command and several times I notified my chain of command that my analysts were overwhelmed with tasks. Because of our ability to understand data mining technology from an intelligence analytical perspective, Dr. Eileen Preisser and I spent a lot of our time inventing new and rewriting traditional analytical processes that gave my analysts even better ability to take advantage of the IDC tools.

Coordination for our support to SOCOM’s Able Danger Project began in December of 1999. After an assessment of our capabilities in comparison to other intelligence organizations, SOCOM requested our support in January of 2000. By February we were conducting massive data mining and analysis of al Qaeda and other terrorist groups associated with that network. I would like to stress that during this time my branch was completely supported by my chain of command that included the Commander of LIWA, Colonel Jim Gibbons, and the Commander of INSCOM, then Major General Robert Noonan.

One of the pivotal questions that has come up since 9/11 is whether or not Mohammed Atta or any of the other hijackers were identified by an infamous chart produced during this time. I reiterate my answer that I gave to the Senate Judiciary Committee that I do not remember seeing Mohammed Atta’s name or face on a single specific chart. The more important point is that our team was tracking hundreds of names and creating dozens of charts for SOCOM. And while most of these charts contained information and intelligence that needed further analytical vetting, we were still able to identify a significant worldwide footprint with a surprisingly large presence within the United States.

In the middle of our preliminary analysis of the data, we were ordered to cease our support to SOCOM due to what we were told were intelligence oversight concerns. While I received the order through my chain of command, we knew that the order had come from somewhere in the Pentagon. Even today neither I, nor any of the other team members that I have spoken with, can say exactly where the order originated. This order, along with a subsequent six month struggle for LIWA and INSCOM to get permission to restart our work was a huge source of frustration felt by both our team and our SOCOM contacts. SOCOM finally grew so impatient with our inability to overcome our work stoppage that they decided to move their analytical operation to a Raytheon facility at Garland, Texas and continue their own efforts without our support. By the time we were allowed to begin work again, the bombing of the USS Cole had changed the face of our entire effort completely.

From the testimony of JD Smith:

From March 1997 to August, 2000, I worked at Orion Scientific Systems, McLean, Virginia, as a Program Manager. From March 1997 to approximately 15 September 1999, I managed and performed criminal intelligence support activities within the Gulf States Initiative (GSI) Program – an unique joint federal (U.S. Army/National Guard)/multi-state (Alabama, Louisiana, Georgia and Mississippi) effort by working with specialized contractor support personnel and the U.S. government to assist/upgrade criminal intelligence support information technology hardware, software, communications, facilities, and training within the mentioned states.

As the GSI Program was being phased out, I had met with personnel at Fort Belvoir (the GSI Headquarters [HQ] location) concerning Orion’s ability to perform similar support to elements of the U.S. Army. In discussions and meetings about our capabilities, I met Dr. Eileen Preisser, Chief Intelligence Officer, U.S. Army INSCOM HQ, Land Information Warfare Activity (LIWA) at Fort Belvoir. After multiple meetings and discussions held at Fort Belvoir and at Orion Scientific Systems (8400 Westpark Drive, McLean, VA), a formal support proposal was presented to Dr. Preisser on or about 12 October 1999.

My recollection is that during a two-week period (i.e., the end of October 1999), Orion Scientific and the U.S. Army were able to establish a, “Task Order Contract” (i.e., funding provided for individual tasking – no guaranteed work or tasking by the Government). All tasking would come from INSCOM, specifically Dr. Preisser to Orion with me (James D. Smith), the Program Manager/Task Manager, responsible for assigned products/deliverables as well as the accountability for hours charged per task by experienced intelligence analysts....

Notes (incomplete), from my monthly calendar for this time period reveal the following:
• 26 October 1999, Dr. Preisser, James Smith, and John Sconda met to discuss Orion MAGIC (Orion proprietary software) capabilities.
• 1, 2, 3 November 1999, Dr. Preisser, James Smith, and others met to discuss a task research activity concerning “Chinese military and business influences around the globe.”
• 09 November 1999, James Smith met with Dr. Heath at INSCOM and Orion’s support Task Order contract was started.
• 17 November 1999, Dr. Heath and staff met at Orion for discussions.
• 22, 23 November 1999, James Smith met with Dr. Heath at Fort Belvoir.
• 01, 02, 03 December 1999, James Smith met with Colonel Worsocki (sp.) concerning Orion’s unclassified collection processes and possible studies.
• 20 December 1999, Task Order Delivery to LIWA (product not identified).
• 13 January 2000, Dr. Preisser presentation to Command (all input sent to her on time – topic not identified).
• 19 January 2000, Meeting with Dr. M. Heymann concerning LIWA support.
• 20 January 2000, Briefing from James Smith to Major Erik Kleinsmith (topic unknown).
• 24 January 2000, Major Task Order delivery to Dr. Preisser (Taliban Visual chart).
• 03 February 2000, Meeting with Dr. Heath and staff on progress.
• 08 February 2000, James Smith met with Major Kleinsmith and Dr. Heymann
• 09 February 2000, Orion produced additional information concerning China to Dr. Preisser for meeting 10 February 2000, with the SSCI.
• 22 February 2000, James Smith met with Major Kleinsmith (4 hours) concerning a Project Plan (subject of Plan unidentified).
• 23 February 2000, Information (data extraction) samples discussed with Dr. Preisser of Law Enforcement related and open source data.
• 28, 29 February 2000, James Smith worked on the DIESCON II proposal.
• 01 March 2000, James Smith prepared a report of all direct labor charges to report to INSCOM.
• 02 March 2000, James Smith met with Dr. Heath and staff concerning developed Program Plan.
• 06 March 2000, New LIWA Task Order assigned (topic not identified).
• 08 March 2000, Task Order delivery given to Major Kleinsmith by James Smith.
• 10 March 2000, Task Order meetings at Fort Belvoir (4 hours).
• 17 March 2000, James Smith attends meetings at LIWA all morning (4 hours).
• 23 March 2000, Orion plans to install “Magic” at LIWA per request.
• 27, 28, 29 March 2000, installation of Magic at LIWA.
• 31 March 2000, James Smith meetings at LIWA (4 hours).
• 05 April 2000, James Smith meets with Major Kleinsmith all morning at LIWA (4 hours).
• 06 April 2000, James Smith met with Dr. Heymann (topics not identified).
• 07 April 2000, James Smith met with LIWA for two hours – progress report.
• 14 April 2000, James Smith met with Dr. Heath and staff concerning deliverables.
• 18, 20, 21 April 2000, James Smith met with Major Kleinsmith and Colonel Worsocki (sp.)
• 27 April 2000, Major Kleinsmith and Dr. Preisser hosted at Orion for major meeting (topics not identified).
• 28 April 2000, James Smith met at LIWA for monthly progress reporting.
• 01 May 2000, James smith delivered major research activity to LIWA (topic not identified).
• 02 May 2000, James Smith prepared a major Task Order Report with future budget needs projected.
• 05 May 2000, LIWA meeting (4 hours).
• 08 May 2000, James Smith met with Major Kleinsmith (4 hours).
• 11 May 2000, James Smith delivered Task Order charts, fiscal reports and projections.
• 25 May 2000, Task Order delivery to LIWA (chart with data not identified).
• 30 May 2000, James Smith delivered to LIWA monthly reports.
• 09 June 2000, James Smith meets at Fort Belvoir (no further information).
• 17, 18 19 July 2000, Multiple meetings with Major Kleinsmith and Dr. Preisser – topics unknown.
• 04 August 2000, last day at Orion for James Smith

From an October 9, 2005 op-ed written by F. Michael Maloof:

If we only had acted

Rep. Curt Weldon, Pennsylvania Republican, correctly asserts the terrorist attack on America on September 11, 2001, could have been averted.
The assertion was based on his efforts as early as 1999 to create a national collaborative or fusion center. It would data-mine vast amounts of information from U.S. intelligence and law enforcement to confront such asymmetrical threats as terrorism, proliferation, illegal arms trafficking, espionage, narcotics and information warfare and cyber-terrorism.
It was a process that produced, among other things, the Able Danger open-source analysis that reportedly revealed hijacker Mohamed Atta as a potential terrorist before the attack.
Mr. Weldon first sought help from Eileen Preisser, who ran the Information Dominance Center at the U.S. Army's Land Information Warfare Activity (LIWA) at Fort Belvoir, Va. He then asked this writer to work with Ms. Preisser to see how the Army initiative could be expanded into a national effort.
As Mr. Weldon envisioned it, the national collaborative center would have been comprised of a system of mini-centers or "pods" of some 34 entities from the U.S. intelligence community and law enforcement agencies to function in a common operating environment.
It would not have been just another analytical unit. The effect of data-mining information that had already been analyzed was to game-plan particular issues and offer options to policymakers and national commanders to deal with them.
For example, say terrorists in South America work with drug cartels raise money to buy weapons on the "gray" arms market to smuggle to terror cells in the U.S. Information from independent analytical centers dedicated to the elements in this hypothetical scenario would be fused at the center to determine a course of action.
Potential end-users would have been the White House, Congress, State and Defense Departments, Joint Chiefs of Staff, the regional commanders-in-chiefs (CINCs) and government operation centers.
In a July 30, 1999, letter to then-Deputy Defense Secretary John Hamre, Mr. Weldon proposed creating a national entity "that can acquire, fuse and analyze disparate data from many agencies to support the policymaker in taking action against asymmetrical threats. "These challenges are beginning to overlap, thereby blurring their distinction while posing increasing threats to our nation."
Mr. Weldon pointed out that the Defense Department "has a unique opportunity" to create a centralized national center, which he called the National Operations Analysis Hub (NOAH, to protect against the "flood of threats."
The NOAH would have been created by presidential executive order as a tool of the National Security Council. The Defense Department would have been designated to run it.
Mr. Weldon's proposal, however, met with immediate opposition from the Defense Department. The office of the assistant secretary for command, control, communications and intelligence (C3I), now renamed networks and information integration, especially pushed for creating the Joint Central Analytic Group (JCAG). C3I was concerned that money for the national collaborative center would be diverted from the long-sought JCAG counterintelligence analytical center.
Unfortunately, the JCAG, now at the Defense Intelligence Agency at Bolling Air Force Base, doesn't talk to other analytical centers that deal with various asymmetrical threats.
Nor do the other existing analytical centers dedicated to collecting information on terrorism, proliferation, arms smuggling and other threats talk to each another regularly.
Following the initial DoD turndown, Ellen Preisser and this writer then data-mined unclassified information to report to Mr. Weldon on possible Chinese front companies in the United States seeking technology for the People's Liberation Army.
It showed how Chinese front companies in the United States listed as U.S. corporations were acquiring U.S. weapons technology from U.S. defense contractors, and improving China's military capability. Such access to U.S. technology then would allow the Chinese over time to duplicate U.S. military systems down to the widget.
Indeed, a June 27, 2005 article in The Washington Times reported U.S. investigators were concerned with China and its middlemen increasingly and illegally obtaining "sensitive or classified U.S. weapons technology" from U.S. companies.
Reaction to the study on Chinese front companies in the United States from the Army and the General Counsel's office in the Office of the Defense Secretary was immediate. In November 1999, they ordered the study destroyed, but not before Mr. Weldon complained to then Army Chief of Staff Eric K. Shinseki.
Mr. Weldon also wrote a letter to then-FBI Director Louis Freeh requesting an espionage investigation. Mr. Freeh never responded to the Weldon request.
Then in an April 14, 2000, memorandum from the legal counsel in the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Capt. Michael Lohr wrote that the concern over the LIWA initiative potentially bumped into what amounted to domestic spying.
"Preliminary review of subject methodology raised the possibility that LIWA 'data mining' would potentially access both foreign intelligence (FI) information and domestic information relating to U.S. citizens (i.e. law enforcement, tax, customs, immigration, etc," Capt. Lohr wrote.
"I recognize that an argument can be made that LIWA is not 'collecting' in the strict sense (i.e. they are accessing public areas of the Internet and non-FI federal government databases of already lawfully collected information)," Capt. Lohr added. "This effort would, however, have the potential to pull together into a single database a wealth of privacy-protected U.S. citizen information in a more sweeping and exhaustive manner than was previously contemplated."
In effect, the national collaborative center experiment based on the LIWA example was sidelined.
If the concept of the NOAH had been in effect on September 11, 2001, events may have been different. The cost for such a system would have been minimal compared to the heavy cost in human life and resources the nation suffered.

F. Michael Maloof is a former senior analyst in the Office of the Defense Secretary.

Committee on Government Reform hearing on October 12, 2001:

Mr. Shays: In a briefing we had yesterday, we had Eileen Pricer, who argues that we don't have the data we need because we don't take all the public data that is available and mix it with the security data. And just taking public data, using, you know, computer systems that are high-speed and able to digest, you know, literally floors' worth of material, she can take relationships that are seven times removed, seven units removed, and when she does that, she ends up with relationships to the bin Laden group where she sees the purchase of
chemicals, the sending of students to universities. You wouldn't see it if you isolated it there, but if that unit is connected to that unit, which is connected to that unit, which is connected to that unit, you then see the relationship. So we don't know ultimately the authenticity of how she does it, but when she does it, she comes up with the kind of answer that you have just asked, which is a little unsettling.

USA Today from April 22, 2002:

Eileen Preisser, a professor of homeland and national security at the New Mexico Institute of Mines and Technology, warns that the varied progress among the states in establishing security plans has created a "Frankenstein monster syndrome."

"The states are grabbing what they can and sewing it all together," she says. "What happens, though, when you need it to work and it all collapses or spins out of control?"

Preisser, on loan to the U.S. government as an adviser on homeland security and technology matters, says federal authorities have provided states with few guidelines to ensure that officials are at least giving emergency workers similar levels of training.

"I have a lot of respect for Tom Ridge," Preisser says. "But until his office blesses some kind of national strategy, we're going to have people going off in all different directions."

As for the nation's overall preparedness to deal with a major terrorist incident, Preisser estimates a 50% chance of a successful response if the incident took place near where medical and emergency response teams are plentiful.

Beyond "those centers of excellence," Preisser says, the chances of overall success drop to about 10% in the event of a bioterrorist attack. "I hate to say it," she says, "but we're not prepared like we should be."

ABC World News Tonight from April 30, 2002:

Newscast: Homeland Security Director Tom Ridge faces criticism from Congress and states

PETER JENNINGS, anchor: On Capitol Hill today, congressmen heard testimony from administration officials about the state of homeland security. Tom Ridge, the director of Homeland Security, was not there. The Bush administration refuses to let Mr. Ridge testify before the Congress. Around the country, many people are asking, what progress there is to see. ABC's Jackie Judd has been covering the testimony today, and she reports from Washington.

JACKIE JUDD reporting:

Peter, frustration is mounting across the country about the administration's efforts to make the nation safe from terrorism. As you say, Tom Ridge got a tongue-lashing on Capitol Hill today, but he wasn't there to hear it. The White House says, as an adviser to the president, he doesn't answer to Congress.

(VO) Committee chairman, Democrat Robert Byrd, accused Ridge of keeping the public in the dark.

Senator ROBERT BYRD (Chairman, Senate Appropriations Committee): The real losers are the American people whose lives this government is bound to protect. They're not being given the whole picture.

JUDD: (VO) In Atlanta today, anger at a hearing on how undercover investigators got into four federal buildings, bypassing all security measures.

Representative BOB BARR (Republican, Georgia): They were given, in effect, the keys to the kingdom. In the words of investigators, they owned those buildings.

JUDD: (VO) All 50 states now have homeland security directors, and most have mapped out anti-terrorism plans. But there is no coordination, not even on what computer equipment they should use so the states can talk to one another in a crisis.

Professor EILEEN PREISSER (New Mexico Institute of Mining & Technology): In this kind of an environment, especially when we're dealing with weapons of mass destruction, we do need some kind of policy at the highest level to standardize what happens across the board.

Mr. DAVID DEWHURST (Chairman, Texas Homeland Security Task Force): Fingerprints are 100 percent.

JUDD: (VO) In Texas, the director of homeland security says intelligence about who is slipping across the borders illegally is really no better today than it was before September 11th. David Dewhurst also says even now only a tiny fraction of cargo ships coming into the port of Houston is inspected.

Mr. DEWHURST: These containers can be moved all around the United States before they're inspected. So this affects Wyoming. It affects North Dakota. It affects Kentucky.

JUDD: Ridge plans to unveil a national strategy this fall to help guide the states. Security analysts, Peter, who are sympathetic to Ridge, say the task is so complex, it could take a decade to implement.

JENNINGS: A long time. Many thanks, Jackie. Jackie Judd in Washington.

SIGNAL Magazine from May 2002:

Creating a Knowledge-Based First-Responder Force
By Patrick S. Guarnieri
May 2002

Web-enabled techniques help prepare reaction to weapons of mass destruction.

Before September 11, only a few brave organizations were dedicated to authorizing and funding programs to test advanced technologies for state and federal disaster first responders and train key personnel in their use. For scenarios involving weapons of mass destruction, even fewer offered unclassified-level training in the skills and technology needed by law enforcement and health care personnel. Among those few are the U.S. Air Force Research Laboratory’s Homeland Defense Technology Center in Albuquerque, New Mexico; the U.S. Department of Justice’s Office of Justice Programs, Washington, D.C.; and the New Mexico Institute of Mining and Technology, Socorro. In times of crisis, it has been their experts who arrived on the scene toting a combination of “Men in Black” suitcase technology and advanced supercomputing capabilities to assist the nation’s first responders.

The terrorist attacks and subsequent anthrax incidents, however, quickly brought attention to the critical need for first responders, including health care professionals, to be trained in the use of specialized information, communication and coordination technologies. To address this pressing requirement, several government, military and industry organizations have joined forces to prepare emergency response professionals to deal with erupting crises immediately instead of waiting for the men with the suitcases to arrive.

Dr. Eileen M. Preisser, a professor at the New Mexico Institute of Mining and Technology, is one of the key players in this arena. A congressional fellow on science and technology applicable to national security, she was appointed this year as director of the Air Force Homeland Defense Technology Center. Her role, as she describes it, is “to help prepare American cities for possible terrorist attacks and give them the tools and education required to perform consequence management before any national agency arrives on the scene.”

Since September, a large portion of Preisser’s time has been spent working with Congress and groups from the Executive Office of the President to make U.S. Defense Department command, control, communications, computers, intelligence and coordination technologies available to first responders throughout the United States, Canada and NATO. “My methods are effective, but I knock over ricebowls. I’ve been called everything on Capitol Hill from Xena Warrior Princess to Joan of Arc,” the former Air Force special activities officer says.

Her partners in this mission are C.H. “Butch” Strauv II, program director, Office of National Defense Preparedness within the Office of Justice Programs, and Dr. Van Romero, president, National Domestic Preparedness Consortium, an organization sanctioned by the Office of Justice Programs. The consortium prepares firefighters, law enforcement professionals, medical and other emergency personnel to respond to acts of chemical, biological, nuclear and radiological terrorism. Strauv and Romero facilitate Preisser’s access to law enforcement and emergency medical services personnel, firefighters, public works professionals and mayors from around the country as well as to the university-accredited courses that give structure to the technical training offered online and in the classroom. The consortium already has trained and supported more than one million first responders in the United States, NATO and Canada. Since last September, it has trained approximately 100,000 personnel at strategically located sites across the United States.

Romero and Preisser endeavor to engage anyone and everyone on the threats facing the nation, and they are experts on the topic. “We used to think terrorism wouldn’t happen in the United States, but it has. It cannot be overemphasized that we in the United States are ill prepared for terrorism at home. We cannot train people fast enough. There is a six-month waiting list to get into the consortium’s on-site courses,” Romero notes.

Preisser agrees that the need for training is great. “Time is of the essence here. We have to find better ways to educate, train, support and exercise our first responders on a nationwide basis. Using the Web to offer accredited distance learning and preparing the same courses so they can be tailored for execution at conventions as part of professional continuing education is a logical extension of our work.”

This self-organized partnership recently created a valuable asset for first responders—the Collaborative Engagement Complex, which was built to house a portal system and facilitate collaborative engagement to support the National Domestic Preparedness Consortium in its mission.

The core of the new complex is the RESPOND! architecture, which uses the GENESIS technology Preisser developed in association with a major U.S. defense contractor. Other partners are being brought into this project from within the Defense Department and the civilian sector. The software is used to create threat profiles and terrorism vulnerability assessments for cities, companies or sites anywhere in the country. It not only handles text but also is being augmented to handle audio, video, signals and sensor data, which can be streamed to the responders upon request to track and follow a specific situation. The RESPOND! portal helps create a knowledge-based first-responder force.

RESPOND! will allow for training online and in conference environments on topics such as explosives, hazardous materials, urban search and rescue, weapons of mass destruction (WMD) incident management, public works emergencies and unified command protocols. It uses new Web-based knowledge assessment tools to help instructors create randomly generated digital exams. WebKat and Learning Framework provide secure testing formats for Web-based instruction as well as for tracking students’ grades and progress.

RESPOND! technology creates a knowledge environment where multiple users can interact for education, exercise, training or information sharing. The system assigns first responders passwords and log-on identifications that allow them to send e-mail, enter community-of-interest chat rooms and use the first response white pages to locate a colleague or expert. They can use the technology to do a city-threat assessment using massive data mining and information patterning online. During a crisis, they also will be able to work through the portal on secure lines to connect and collaborate with multiple colleagues anywhere in America.

The technology operates in Windows environments, allowing for the use of audio, video, white boarding, still photography or mapping annotations.

“The RESPOND! architecture is new technology for the first responder that builds upon what was originally Defense Department technology for anti-terrorism and counterterrorism. We call this tech transfer, and it is the fastest way to get advanced technology into the hands of the first responders,” Preisser explains.

According to Strauv, a lot of available technology can be used. Most was developed originally under Justice Department programs that support the consortium. The programs, which cost approximately $100 million annually, provide equipment and training to respond to and manage domestic terrorism safely. The program’s advantage for local municipalities is that first responders normally do not pay for their training if they register with the Office of Justice Programs first. “It’s one of the few benefits of being a hero,” Romero says.

“I think the real travesty to date,” Preisser says, “is that I am not currently training any Defense Department people in these courses, not even reservists. We do not have policies and mechanisms established that allow us to train military personnel as we do civilians in the National Domestic Preparedness Consortium. There is a big fear of many in the Pentagon of military overreach. We have not figured out that the military can help significantly in training and equipping first responders without violating posse comitatus laws.

“What needs to happen is that key professional specialty codes in the active-duty military, the Reserve and National Guard must be identified as first-responder equivalents so they can take and benefit from this WMD consequence management training. One of my key goals for this year is to develop policy and mechanisms to get reserve Department of Defense personnel—who are often on the scene as first responders—trained and educated in the first-responder protocols we are teaching in the consortium. If I can do this with online courses and convention and seminar exposure, so be it. But we have to move out on this. It’s important to all Americans.”

“Eventually,” Preisser continues, “we want to give first responders wearable interface access and smart card technology as well.” Such technology will drastically revamp the way firefighters, police officers, emergency medical technicians and physicians do business across multiple states and municipalities.

Patrick S. Guarnieri is the chief executive officer of the National Conference on Homeland Security. The not-for-profit organization educates, trains and shares information with first responders on issues associated with terrorist incidents involving weapons of mass destruction.

Federal Computer Week on June 12, 2002:

By Dan Caterinicchia

The ultimate success or failure of the Homeland Security Department will be determined by the intelligence and information technology plan that's proposed and the person selected to lead that effort, according to a congressional fellow who advises the Executive Office of the President on technology.

Speaking June 11 at the Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Association's TechNet International 2002 in Washington, D.C., Eileen Preisser, also director of the Defense Department's Homeland Defense Technology Center, said the key will be getting the new department to organize and share information horizontally, instead of vertically in the usual stovepipes.

"The kicker that will determine if it succeeds or fails is the intelligence and IT plan that's prepared," Preisser told Federal Computer Week. "There has to be a [chief information officer or chief operating officer]-type person to bring together all the disparate capabilities that exist and create a new and exciting virtual information environment that will set the pace for everything else in government.

"If you hire a 65-year-old to do it, it will fail. If you hire former military, it will fail."

Preisser said the government should look to someone with experience in a large industry enterprise effort who understands the mission and the roles that the various agencies should play in the "big picture."

"I would like for that to happen, but I don't see that happening," she said.

Preisser said she fears that the new department will just add more bureaucracy to a system already overloaded with red tape. She added that agencies were just beginning to move "horizontally over the last nine months, and forcing them to go back will be the hardest cultural shift."

An interagency organization can be successful as long as the various parts are united by their mission and outfitted with the "same standard suitcase and equipment, and put in the field together," she said, adding that the interagency operational security (OPSEC) group is a prime example of one that works.

However, the only way the proposed Homeland Security Department can break agency stovepipes will be to cut off the individual budgets and fund everything at the department level, Preisser said. And even with the right IT and funding plan, the basic implementation will take anywhere from 15 years to 25 years, she said.

To get at least the basic foundation done faster than that, DOD officials should be given a mentoring role. Preisser said DOD officials have the necessary experience and should be "highly encouraged" to share what they know.

With that idea in mind, the Missile Defense Agency is developing an architecture for "mission-critical test beds" that will produce a common operational picture for itself and the other players involved in a potential accident or strike involving missiles, such as state and local first responders, utility companies and industry partners, Preisser said.

The test beds are designed to help DOD, aided by its partners, to identify text, voice, video or audio data patterns over time that should not be there. "That is the 'so what' of homeland security," she said, adding that terabytes of data are useless if the user can't pinpoint what they need quickly and act on it.

The architecture for this environment should be complete by July, when a decision is made whether to proceed in Texas or Florida. After that, partners will be selected based partly on geographical location, and by September, sites will be configured to use the architecture, Preisser said.

From Federal Computer News on June 17, 2002:

By Dan Caterinicchia

Three top Defense Department officials said last week that DOD could take a larger leadership role in establishing the proposed Homeland Security Department and that the key to the department's success would be the person responsible for information technology.

Eileen Preisser, director of DOD's Homeland Defense Technology Center, said the ultimate success or failure of the Homeland Security Department will be determined by the intelligence and IT plan that's proposed and the person selected to lead that effort. Preisser spoke at the Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Association's TechNet International 2002 conference in Washington, D.C.

"The kicker that will determine if it succeeds or fails is the intelligence and IT plan that's prepared," Preisser, a congressional fellow who also advises the Executive Office of the President on technology, told Federal Computer Week.

"There has to be a [chief information officer or chief operating officer]-type person to bring together all the disparate capabilities that exist and create a new and exciting virtual information environment that will set the pace for everything else in government," Preisser said. "If you hire a 65-year-old to do it, it will fail. If you hire former military, it will fail."

Preisser said the government should tap someone who has worked on an enterprise system for a large corporation and who understands the mission and the roles that the various agencies should play. "I would like for that to happen, but I don't see that happening," she said.

Preisser and Army Lt. Gen. Joseph Kellogg Jr., director of command, control, communications and computers for DOD's Joint Chiefs of Staff, said to bring the department up to speed quickly, DOD officials should be given a mentoring role.

Kellogg told FCW that he has received "marching orders" from Air Force Gen. Richard Myers, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to work with the Office of the Secretary of Defense and other departments to "scope the issue...and get it done."

The greatest challenge facing the Homeland Security Department is integrating the cultures of the agencies it will comprise, Myers said. "It's very difficult to get those cultures to think in a different way, and [without IT] to back it all up, we're putting ourselves at risk, and that's unacceptable," he said.

"We need to capitalize on current technologies to build to the future, because the intent is to link everyone together," Kellogg said, adding that his office is now working on a "proposal on the way ahead to do it."

The only way the Homeland Security Department can break agency stovepipes will be to cut off the agencies' individual budgets and fund everything at the department level, Preisser said. She fears that the new department will just add more bureaucracy to a system already overloaded with red tape and that agencies were just beginning to move "horizontally over the last nine months, and forcing them to go back will be the hardest cultural shift."

"I don't buy that," said Paul Kurtz, senior director for national security for the White House's Office of Cyberspace Security. "It breaks down stovepipes, and that is a key to our success. The refrain has been to bring [the agencies] together to be more powerful. The sum of the total is greater than what we have now."

The government must continue to use and evolve IT, and the related policies and procedures, in a coordinated way. Currently, federal agencies, as well as state and local governments and industry partners, don't know where to go when they possess, or are in search of, certain homeland security information or intelligence, Kurtz said.

"This is the government doing its part to reorganize and coordinate better," he said. "Reorganization isn't the end, it's the beginning. We're trying to make it better."

The White House, in conjunction with the private sector, would release its national strategy for critical infrastructure protection in August or September, but that document will be subject to frequent updates as threats and vulnerabilities change, Kurtz said.

"We're going to make mistakes," he said. "We're new at this. The goal is to release the strategy in August or September and pursue that while the legislation is being put together on [Capitol] Hill. We're trying to do both at the same time."

Press Release for TSM 2003 conference at Murray State:

The conference begins at 6 p.m. April 3 with Dr. Eileen Preisser, Congressional Fellow and Special Assistant for Homeland Defense and National Security, giving the keynote address.

Shane Harris in National Journal on November 7, 2005:

Data Destruction

As quickly as the IDC garnered powerful fans, it also earned some enemies. The center was not a chartered member of the formal intelligence community -- the 14 agencies that in 1999 officially constituted the country's spy apparatus. For a support organization, buried several layers deep in the Army, to tread on territory normally reserved for big-name agencies like the CIA and the Defense Intelligence Agency, and to present intelligence gleaned from the Internet, of all places, was simply anathema to people steeped in decades of intelligence rules and culture. The IDC analysts were mavericks.

In particular, the Defense Intelligence Agency questioned the analysts' results on a number of projects, not just Able Danger, the former IDC employee said. "We'd show them our stuff, and they'd say, 'Show us the math.' " But the answers didn't always add up so neatly. The combination of data mining and hunches sometimes produced results that the bigger intelligence agencies viewed as murky, even if military commanders found them compelling.

At a Pentagon briefing on Able Danger in September of this year, Thomas Gandy, the Army's director of counterintelligence and human intelligence, cautioned reporters about inferring too much information from the "links" the IDC established, particularly because its data-mining tools were far less sophisticated than the ones used today. "Just that there are links established doesn't really mean anything," Gandy said. "In the primacy of this technology, you get some very goofy links that require research."

Kleinsmith and the former employee, as well as others who worked tangentially to the IDC over the years, insisted that the IDC analysts were senior and seasoned, and that they recognized the fact that simple links required further investigation. Yet the analysts' enthusiasm for a less tidy sort of inquiry, which often raised more questions than answers, divided intelligence professionals. Some former government officials, who declined to be named, derided the IDC analysts as "zealots" and said their work never produced the eureka-like results that some, particularly former Able Danger members, now claim.

One senior IDC analyst, Eileen Preisser, who worked with Kleinsmith on Able Danger and other projects, was characterized by a former Defense official as "an uncontrolled flake." Kleinsmith, who called Preisser an "analytical genius," admitted that she "has constant trouble in working with others in the community." Preisser has worked in several intelligence jobs, inside and outside the government, and those who know her see her as the prototypical IDC believer.

She "is especially critical of those folks who she feels did not, or do not, 'get' the technology," Kleinsmith said. "Instead of working within the system, maneuvering around the tough spots, negotiating and dealing, she tends to burn her way through an issue to get where she needs to go." Preisser now works for the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency. A spokeswoman there said Preisser declined all requests for interviews.

In early 2000, in the midst of Able Danger, a lawyer with the Army's general counsel visited Kleinsmith. As Kleinsmith testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee in September, the lawyer reminded him that under Army regulations, any data the IDC collected on U.S. persons -- even inadvertently -- had to be destroyed within 90 days. If analysts could establish a legitimate reason to investigate a person further, they could keep the corresponding data.

But with potentially tens of thousands of names, checking each one would have been impossible, Kleinsmith said. In the Pentagon briefing, Gandy concurred: "I don't think they had the capability to scrub it in the fashion that the oversight rules could live with."

By the spring of 2000, Kleinsmith said, the IDC had the list of 20 individuals whom Special Operations wanted investigated further under Able Danger. But in March, Kleinsmith was ordered to cease all work on the project. He believes the order came from outside the IDC's command. From May to June, Kleinsmith and his team destroyed the information, and possibly the linkages between Mohamed Atta, Al Qaeda, and convicted terrorists already sitting in U.S. prisons.

"It was terrible," Kleinsmith said.

'So It Begins'

After the data purge, the heartbeat of the IDC slowed. In late September 2000, the center was authorized to begin new work on Able Danger, Kleinsmith said. A data harvest would take no time to replicate, but the analysis on people and locations was much harder to reproduce.

But Able Danger never ramped up a second time. On October 12, while the USS Cole was docked in Yemen's port city of Aden, Al Qaeda suicide bombers rammed the destroyer with a small explosive-laden boat, killing 17 U.S. sailors and wounding 39. From then on, U.S. Central Command, responsible for the Middle East, became the IDC's primary customer, Kleinsmith said. Special Operations Command, unhappy because the IDC's attention had shifted, moved Able Danger to a private intelligence research center run by Raytheon in Garland, Texas, Kleinsmith said.

A Raytheon spokesman did not respond to a request for comment. But Eileen Preisser, the IDC analyst who had worked on Able Danger with Kleinsmith, was working for Raytheon after the September 11 attacks. In a 2001 interview with National Journal, she spoke of projects she was involved with that were essentially the same as those at the IDC.

After the Cole bombing, the IDC concentrated on projects not related to Al Qaeda. "We went on to do some other things, other projects," the former IDC employee said. Less than a year later, the 9/11 attackers struck. Looking back, Kleinsmith doesn't claim that he saw the attacks coming. Rather, he felt resigned. "I wasn't surprised," he said. He had studied Al Qaeda's evolution and believed he knew its capabilities. "I thought, 'So it begins.'

Total Information Awareness

The 9/11 attacks breathed some new life into the Information Dominance Center. In late 2001, retired Navy Adm. John Poindexter, who had served as President Reagan's national security adviser, met with the director of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, where Poindexter was soon to be employed. Poindexter was looking for a site to test new technologies under his Total Information Awareness program, which, not unlike the IDC, aimed to use open-source data and government information to understand terrorism.

TIA also looked at tools to examine commercial databases containing information on U.S. citizens, within the context of privacy regulations.

Poindexter wanted a proving ground staffed by seasoned, technology-inclined analysts, a "Manhattan Project" for counterterrorism, he said. The DARPA director, Tony Tether, told him to consider the IDC. After meeting with Gen. Alexander, the Army commander overseeing the center, Poindexter agreed to test some of the TIA tools at the IDC.

"TIA was a very good concept," the former IDC employee said. The center offered TIA "a high-speed testing bed" for its new technologies. "Some of the tools sucked, and some of them were good ideas," the employee said. The frustration came from officials' reluctance to use the tools for active intelligence projects. Poindexter emphasized that TIA was a research project and wasn't using data mining as part of any real intelligence operations. TIA was an experiment.

But the experiment was short-lived. In late 2002, Poindexter's role in TIA was revealed in the press. The controversial retired admiral's past caught up with him -- Poindexter was the central figure in the Iran-Contra scandal, which diverted the profits from covert arms sales to Iran to anti-Communist rebels in Nicaragua.

Members of Congress derided TIA as an Orwellian excess of the post-9/11 era. The funding was pulled. Kleinsmith, who had left the Army by the time TIA arrived, seemed perplexed by lawmakers' concerns. "We've had this capability for years," he remembered thinking. "Who cares?"

TIA's detractors declared a victory for privacy protection when they killed the project. Poindexter was forced to resign in August 2003. But research on TIA tools has hardly ceased.

Rather, it has moved into the intelligence agencies, where the work and the budgets for it are classified, Poindexter said, noting that now Congress has more-limited oversight and should be more concerned about privacy infringements. The former IDC employee concurred, saying "The [TIA] concept hasn't died off. It continues. And it continues elsewhere now, and I can't talk about that. The tools are continuing to be developed."

Government Computer News from May 6, 2002:

TechNet International 2002.

You and your guest are invited Tech Net International Gala Evening

Tuesday, D.C. Convention Center Exhibit Halls A & B

Enjoy a Buffet Dinner and Technology Tour followed by a special performance by the irreverently uproarious "Capitol Steps"

5:30 p.m. - 9:15 p.m.

Dress

Civilian - Business Attire

Military - Duty Uniform

RSVP -www.technet2002.org

The Department of Defense finds this event meets the minimum regulatory standards for attendance by Dod employees. This finding does not constitute a blanket approval or endorsement for attendence.

Technet International 2002

AFCEA'S 56TH ANNUAL CONVENTION AND EXPOSITION

TechNet International 2002 is one of the nation's largest [C.sub.4]I conferences and expositions- everything for the communications, electronics, intelligence and information systems professional.

It's FREE, but it's priceless!

Five VALUABLE reasons you can't afford to miss TechNet International 2002:

1. Hear from top-level military leaders

2. Participate in dynamic PANEL SESSIONS and the SMALL BUSINESS SEMINAR

3. Learn in PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT CENTER MINI-COURSES

4. Network with your peers

5. See, touch, and try out cutting-edge technologies in the SOLUTIONS SHOWCASE.

Register for TechNet International 2002 today! To register, visit www.technet2002.org

Registration for admission to the exposition, panel sessions, and specified addresses is FREE. On-site admission to the exposition, panel sessions, and specified addresses is FREE to members of AFCEA, military personnel, government employees, and employees of corporate sponsors and exhibiting companies. All others pay a $50 fee on-site.

General Information

DoD Approval

The Department of Defense finds Tech Net International 2002 meets the minimum regulatory standards for attendance by DoD employees. This finding does not constitute a blanket approval or endorsement for attendance. Individual DoD Component commands or organizations are responsible for approving attendance of its DoD employees based on mission requirements and DoD regulations.

Retirement Point Credits

The military services vary in the awarding of retirement point credits. If you would like to earn retirement point credits for attending panel discussions, please check with your unit and bring the required forms for verification to the Will Call Ticket Booth in the Convention Center.

Dress

All TechNet International 2002 events are business dress. Military personnel are encouraged to wear duty uniform.

AFCEA supports the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990. Attendees with special needs should call (703) 631-6130.

Hotel and Travel

Headquarters Hotel

Grand Hyatt Hotel

1000 H Street, NW

Washington, D.C. 20001

1-800-223-1234

(202)587-1234

reserve@wasghpo.hyatt.com

To take advantage of the special rate, be sure to book your reservations by identifying "AFCEA TechNet 2002" to the reservation department. Rooms are assigned on a first-come basis and subject to availability.

Hospitality suites at the Grand Hyatt hotel are restricted to exhibiting companies only.

UNITED

United Airlines Is offering special meeting fares for all attendees who use the Special Meeting Desk to book their reservations. Book early and take advantage of the promotional fares that give you the greatest savings. Earn a 5% discount off the lowest applicable fare, including First Class, or 10% off the mid-week coach fare. Simply call (or have your travel agent call) 1-800-521-4041 and refer to Meeting ID number 597BQ. Mileage plus members receive full credit for all miles flown to this meeting.

Metro

Take Metrorail's Orange, Red, or Blue Lines to Metro Center Station. Or take Metrorail's Yellow, Green, or Red Line to Gallery Place Station.

Walking and driving directions available at www.technet2002.org.

Featured Speakers

*Ticket required. Tickets available at www.technet2002.org.

Defense Keynote Luncheon

and 2002 David Sarnoff Award Winner

Gen Richard B. Myers, USAF

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Four Star Breakfast Series

GEN Paul J. Kern, USA

Commanding General

U.S. Army Materiel Command

ADM William J. Fallon, USN

Vice Chief of Naval Operations

Lt Gen Bruce A. Wright, USAF

Vice Commander

Air Combat Command

The Industry Perspective

C. Michael Armstrong

Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer AT&T

Back by Popular Demand! J-6 Luncheon Panel

Moderator: LTG Joseph K. Kellogg Jr., USA

Director, J-6

The Joint Staff

Panel Sessions

Admission to panel sessions is free to all registrants.

Application of Information Technology to Homeland Security

Tuesday, June 11, 9:00 a.m. -- 10:30 a.m.

Moderator:

Donald Zimmerman, CEO, Synergy, Inc., Senior Vice President, Information Technology Division, SOZA & Co., Ltd.

Panelists include:

Alan Harbitter, PEC Solutions

Dr. Eileen Preisser, Director, Air Force Homeland Defense Technology Center

Network Centric Warfare:

Approaches to Implementation

Tuesday, June 11, 2:00 p.m. -- 3:30 p.m.

Moderator:

Paul R. Brubaker, Chief Executive Officer, Aquilent, Inc.

Panelists include:

MG Steven W. Boutelle, USA, Director, Information Operations, Networks and Space, Office of the Secretary of the Army

Maj Gen Charles E. Croom, Jr., USAF, Vice Director for Command, Control, Communications and Computer Systems, The Joint Staff

LTG David j. Kelley, USA (Ret.), Vice President, Information Operations, Lockheed Martin Mission Systems

Rick Rosenburg, Program Executive, Navy Marine Corps Intranet (NMCI) Strike Force, EDS

Biometrics: Integration of Technologies for Information Security

Wednesday, June 12, 9:00 a.m. -- 10:30 a.m.

Moderator:

Jeff Dunn, National Security Agency, Co-Chair, Biometric Consortium

Panelists include:

Joseph Atick, Chief Executive Officer, Visionics

LTG Peter Cuviello, USA, Director, Information Systems for Command, Control and Computers

Cathy Tilton, SAFLink, Chair, Biometrics API Committee, Biometrics Consortium

Smart Card Applications

Wednesday, June 12, 2:00 p.m. -- 3:30 p.m.

Moderator:

Mary Dixon, Director, DoD Smart Card Program, Office of the Secretary of Defense

Panelists include:

LTC Greta Lehman, USA, Program Manager, U.S. Army Secure Electronic Transaction-Device Office

Dave Wennergren, Chairman, Smart Card Senior Coordinating Group

Jim Zok, U.S. Department of Transportation

Emergency Communications and Infrastructure Reconstitution

Thursday, June 13, 9:00 a.m. -- 10:30 a.m.

Moderator:

Brenton Greene, Deputy Manager, National Communications System

Panelists include:

Joe Wassel, Office of the Secretary of Defense

Professional Development Center Mini-Courses

Admission to mini-courses is free.

An overview of AFCEA's most popular PDC courses:

MILSATCOM

Tuesday, June 11

9:00 a.m. -- Noon

Wednesday, June 12

1:45 p.m. -- 4:45 p.m.

The Military Satellite Communications course covers the whole spectrum of MILSATCOM programs and issues. It also gives up to date visibility into the latest OSD initiatives, including the Transitional Communications Study (TCS) and the National Security SATCOM Systems Synchronization (NS4R) Roadmap.

Instructor: James Mazzei

Information Assurance, Roadmap to Excellence

Tuesday, June 11

1:45 p.m. -- 4:45 p.m.

Wednesday, June 12

9:00 a.m. -- Noon

The Information Assurance, Roadmap to Excellence course covers the entire spectrum of Information Assurance issues. The course provides current information regarding the use of biometrics along with passwords to achieve multi-factor identification and authentication. Timely information regarding joint NIST and NSA initiatives in COTS IT product evaluation using the Common Criteria is provided as well. Instructor: James E. Wingate, CISSP

Schedule
(*)Ticket required. Tickets available at www.technet2002.org.
morning
7:30 8:00
Tuesday, June 11
7:30 a.m. - 8:45 a.m.
Four Star Breakfast Series (*)
GEN Paul J. Kern, USA
Commanding General
U.S. Army Materiel
Command
8:00 a.m. - Noon
Career Transition
Seminar
Wednesday, June 12
7:30 a.m. - 8:45 a.m.
Four Star Breakfast Series (*)
ADM William J. Fatlon, USN
Vice Chief of Naval
Operations
Thursday, June 13
7:30 a.m. - 8:45 a.m.
Four Star Breakfast Series (*)
Lt Gen Bruce A. Wright, USAF
Vice Commandar Air Combat
Command
7:30 9:00 10:00
Tuesday, June 11
7:30 a.m. - 8:45 a.m. 9:00 a.m. - 10:30 a.m.
Four Star Breakfast Series (*) Panel Session
GEN Paul J. Kern, USA Application of Information
Commanding General Technology to Homeland
U.S. Army Materiel Security
Command
9:00 a.m. - Noon
PDC Mini-Cource
MILSATCOM
Wednesday, June 12
7:30 a.m. - 8:45 a.m. 9:00 a.m. - 10:30 a.m.
Four Star Breakfast Series (*) Panel Sesion
ADM William J. Fatlon, USN Biometrics: Integration of
Vice Chief of Naval Technologies for Information
Operations Security
9:00 a.m. - Noon
PDC Mini-Cource
Infomation Assurance: Roadmap
to Excellence
Thursday, June 13
7:30 a.m. - 8:45 a.m. 9:00 a.m. - 10:30 a.m.
Four Star Breakfast Series (*) Panel Session
Lt Gen Bruce A. Wright, USAF Emergency Communication and
Vice Commandar Air Combat Infrastructure Reconstitution
Command
9:30 a.m. - 11:30 a.m.
Business Opportunity Workshop
for Small Business
7:30 11:00 Noon
Tuesday, June 11
7:30 a.m. - 8:45 a.m. Noon - 1:30 p.m.
Four Star Breakfast Series (*) Defense Keynote Luncheon (*)
GEN Paul J. Kern, USA Gen Richard B. Myers, USAF
Commanding General Chariman of the Joint Chiefs
U.S. Army Materiel of Staff
Command
Wednesday, June 12
7:30 a.m. - 8:45 a.m. Noon - 1:30
Four Star Breakfast Series (*) J-6 Luncheon Panel (*)
ADM William J. Fatlon, USN Moderator:
Vice Chief of Naval LTG Joseph K. Kellogg Jr.,
Operations USA
Director, Command, Control
Communications and Computer
Systems (J-6)
The Joint Staff
Thursday, June 13
7:30 a.m. - 8:45 a.m. Noon - 1:30 p.m.
Four Star Breakfast Series (*) Luncheon (*)
Lt Gen Bruce A. Wright, USAF C. Michael Armstrong
Vice Commandar Air Combat Chairman of the Board and
Command Chief Executive Officer
AT&T
7:30 1:00
Tuesday, June 11
7:30 a.m. - 8:45 a.m.
Four Star Breakfast Series (*)
GEN Paul J. Kern, USA
Commanding General
U.S. Army Materiel
Command
Wednesday, June 12
7:30 a.m. - 8:45 a.m.
Four Star Breakfast Series (*)
ADM William J. Fatlon, USN
Vice Chief of Naval
Operations
Thursday, June 13
7:30 a.m. - 8:45 a.m.
Four Star Breakfast Series (*)
Lt Gen Bruce A. Wright, USAF
Vice Commandar Air Combat
Command

Posted by Mike at September 16, 2006 05:46 PM

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