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March 07, 2006
Who is Jay Boesen?
Just doing some research here, but I think he is important.
From the National Conference on Homeland Security in October 2002:
Technical Board of DirectorsJay Boesen - Senior Counter Intelligence analyst and field officer specializing in European, Middle East and Asian terrorism. He is a former senior consultant for analytical tradecraft at the Defense Intelligence Agency's Joint Terrorism Analysis Center's Counter Terrorism course. Mr. Boesen served as liaison at the DCI Counter-terrorist Center at the Central Intelligence Agency. He has also served as guest lecturer at the CIA's Analytical Risk Management Course.
From the same site in October 2004:
Technical Board of DirectorsJ. L. Boesen - has a Bachelor's degree in Liberal Arts from the University of the State of New York and a Master's degree in International Relations from Troy State University. Mr. Boesen is the author of the Vulnerability Assessment Fundamentals Course and the Advanced Vulnerability Assessment Course at the U. S. Department of Energy. He was the Special Advisor for Intelligence to the D.O.E. Director of Safeguards and Security. Mr. Boesen served as liaison at the DCI Counter-terrorist Center at the Central Intelligence Agency and was responsible for analytic training and support at the Defense Intelligence Agency's (DIA) Joint Terrorism Analysis Center. He currently serves as a faculty member in automated analytical methodologies and exercise scenario development for the DIA and Interagency Intelligence Committee on Terrorism's "Counter-terrorism Analysis Course,” Mr. Boesen was a senior tactics instructor and course chief with the US Air Force Security Police Academy, was a lead instructor and course developer for vulnerability assessment training at the Department of Energy Non-Proliferation and National Security Institute's Central Training Academy. While assigned to the European region he was recognized for his efforts in fighting terrorism by the German Federal Police Office (Bundeskriminalamt) earning the title of "Honorary Kriminalkommissar." He has conducted some of the first terrorism risk assessments in the world. Mr. Boesen is co-author of an NCHS published book entitled "The Al-Qaeda Network".
The Law Enforcement Intelligence section was developed and is maintained by members of our Technical Advisory Board and the Genesis Intelligence Laboratory at Raytheon. To review the credentials of our Technical Advisory Board, go to the About Us section of this web site.The Raytheon Genesis System utilizes “best of breed”, commercially available applications coupled with proprietary software and processes to mine, exploit and analyze all-source intelligence data. Characterized by extreme speed and super computing capacity, Genesis can provide solutions to all strategic, operational and tactical intelligence problems. The end product of this process is actionable intelligence that all operators and first responders can utilize to detect, deter, disrupt and/or neutralize asymmetric threats.
The Law Enforcement Intelligence section contains weekly updated information concerning the following subjects.
** Intelligence concerning terrorist organizations domestically and abroad.
** Charts concerning Al-Qaeda members their affiliations and photographs.
** Current information on radical and protest groups which may pose threats to the United States domestically or abroad.
** Information concerning safety of U.S. citizens at various locations domestically and abroad.
** Information concerning new methods of operation, potential venues and weaponry.
** Analysis of current intelligence data.In order to gain access to this section you must be a local, state or federal law enforcement agency. After you provide the information requested, The National Conference on Homeland Security will verify its accuracy and provide you with a user name and password. Non-law enforcement entities should contact NCHS directly for a determination as to whether they may gain access. Once you have gained access, you will be provided with navigation instructions.
TO LEARN MORE ABOUT GENESIS
You may contact Jay Boesen at Raytheon
(703) 391-2913, Extension 7063
To screen people, the data would be mined through a system that Raytheon called Genesis, which, Woollen explained vaguely, could track "certain patterns of behavior" that indicated someone was a threat.None of that was enough by itself, Woollen added. The real value Raytheon added was that the Raytheon system would be "proactive." Once a visitor arrived here, his data would be constantly updated, so that everything he did would be "tracked during the entire lifetime of the visa." If he got into trouble here and was wanted by the police, or even if new information about his prior activities was developed by Genesis, he'd be placed on a new lookout list so that he could be apprehended.
Depending on your point of view, it was all fascinating, scary, or encouraging. But Peterman and the man from the White House science office also knew that it was wildly expensive. To take one example, how could they pay for the biometric scanners -- whether of the iris, the palm, or the face -- at every border crossing? And how would someone be apprehended once put on a lookout list? Where would all the checkpoints be?
Nonetheless, these Raytheon guys seemed determined to build a system that, in some form, had to be built, so Peterman gave them the name of the procurement people at INS who were overseeing the development of the entry-exit system, and said they should get a meeting over there. He added the now standard speech that all homeland security staffers had learned -- which was that they did not make any purchasing decisions.
According to an attorney named Wade Birdwell:
When Able Danger powered up, Dr. Preisser became the head of the data evaluation group within the program, apparently applying the Genesis data-mining technology (or a derivative thereof), the development for which she was at least partially responsible. Over the next few months, she and her group developed a list of approximately 80 possible Al-Queda operatives, including Atta, and a Brooklyn cell, and made at least three attempts to get the FBI/DOJ to initiate an investigation based upon their findings.If Weldon presents evidence tomorrow of the success of Able Danger in predicting an attack that became the attack on the U.S.S. Cole attack in October 2000, and that the Pentagon/DOD received the warning, but ignored it, then we can reasonably infer that the Pentagon/DOD knew that Dr. Preisser and her group were on the right track in doing the very thing they were supposed to be doing, i.e., discovering, predicting and, thereby, preventing Al-Queda activity before it occurred. If they were not so aware, we can reasonably infer that Dr. Preisser and her group attempted to make them aware over the course of the next few months. We can also reasonably infer that Dr. Preisser and her group went back to their data and became more convinced than ever that they had a line on Al-Queda in the form of that list of 80 possible operatives, and that they would have attempted to bring this back up with the powers that be.
Unfortunately, this would all have occurred during the Florida recount debacle. But it is at least possible that this critical information in Clinton Administration efforts ( I use that term advisedly) made it some way up the chain of command, and was available to both the Clinton Administration and the incoming Bush 43 Administration.
My guess, it stopped at some fairly high career bureaucrat(s) because they didn't want their betters to know that they could have stopped the U.S.S. Cole attack, but didn't. Then, the 2.5 teragigs of data get deep sixed shortly thereafter, ostensibly because the Pentagon/DOD was worried about being accused of domestic spying.
The point of all this is that Dr. Preisser, again, a critical member of the DOD intelligence community presumably knew all of this was going on, and can testify that her superiors ignored not only her unsubstantiated warnings about the 80 possible operatives, but also her clear success in predicting the U.S.S. Cole attack almost a year before the 9/11 attack.
From a Raytheon presentation on Genesis:
So the intelligence side, we are now bringing together the data. There is, of course, the question of how do we absorb that and be able to use it and put it all together make the right decisions. In this area, we have tools, not only at Raytheon, but at all other places, that are incredible. In our case, the front page that you saw, there’s a tool called Genesis. If I give Genesis your name, Genesis will find out more about you than you could ever remember about yourself. That is a key tool to look into people, visitors that are coming in. That is not just data that is available publicly, but other data that may be available also; it puts it all together and it yields a recommendation to a border guard, to an analyst, et cetera, on the basis of the data available.
Excerpts from "1000 Years for Revenge" by Peter Lance that mention Jay Boesen.
Page 235:
In light of what we now know was going on in Manila at the time, Khalifa's release has to be considered one of the most grevious instances of negligence in the years leading up to 9/11. Even given the need to apease Jordan, a key U.S. ally in the Mideast, the release of Khalifa represents disturbing evidence of just how badly the FBI and State, two of the nation's top antiterrorism agencies, were at odds."I remember people at CIA who were ripshit at the time," said Jacob L. Bosesen, who worked as an analyst tasked from the Department of Energy to the CIA's Counter Terrorism Center. "Not even speaking in retrospect, but contemporaneous with what the intelligence community knew about bin Laden, Khalifa's deportation was unreal."
Page 357:
Ronnie Bucca was a fire marshal. By any traditional definition, terrorism wouldn;t have been even remotely close to his jurisdiction. But he had seen the 1993 World Trade Center bombing as an act of arson, and one that touched him personally. Now the four main conspirators and the bomb maker himself had been convicted. The blind Sheikh and the other member of his "jihad army" would be locked up for years. any other investigator might have given up and moved on. But not Bucca. He was the firefighter who had fallen five stories and worked his way back to Rescue One.As the spring of 1997 arrived, he continued to believe that the Trade Center was a potential target. "He said, 'They're gonna come back and do it again,'" said Jacob L. Boesen, an analyst who worked with Ronnis at the Defense Intelligence Analysis Center at Bolling Air Force Base in Washington, D.C. "I said to him, 'They did it once.' But he said, 'Some of those people have folded now into al Qaeda.'"
Boesen, who wrote a study on al Qaeda for the National Conference on Homeland Security, said Bucca was a rare combination. "Ronnie's military experience as an intelligence officer gave him an analytical role, and his experience as a Special Ops Green Beret gave him an operational perspective," said Boesen. "He was the real deal. He has was frustrated because the Bureau was the lead player in New York when it came to terrorism and he couldn't get anybody on the Task Force to listen."
Page 382:
By late November, Ronnie was visiting firehouses to discuss terrorism preparedness with the rank and file. In July he'd taken a course in advanced counterterrorism analysis at the Joint Military Intelligence Training Center. In his capacity as an analyst with the 3413th Military Intelligence Detachment, Ronnie and his unit would now meet at least once a month with Jacob Boesen, an analyst with the Defense Intelligence Analysis Center, who would come up from Washington to Fort Dix and deliver chalk talks on the latest terrorism intelligence."We were working in asymmetrical threat analysis," said Boesen, "using a program called Analyst's Notebook the helped us produce link charts of the entire Al Qaeda organization." The charts, like the one of page 362-63, allowed DIA analysts to step back and take a broad snapshot of Osama bin Laden's organization and its related cells.
Boesen remembered one session in particular. "After we'd finished," he said, "Ronnie pulled me aside and asked what I thought the chances would be of al Qaeda hittin New York again. At that point the sense in law enforcement had been that Yousef and his cell were finished. But Ronnie seemed to sense that was something else in the works. That's when he asked me about KSM."
Bucca had seen Khalid Sheikh Mohammed's name in the unsealed bin Laden indictment, and he wanted to pick Boesen's brain to see what he knew.
"The truth was, we knew very little about him at the time," said Boesen. "Just what was in the intel from Manila. We knew the FBI had tried to grab him in Qatar. But what we didn't know was that he was now in Hamburg meeting with Mohammed Atta and the other members of the 9/11 cell."
Posted by Mike at March 7, 2006 09:33 PM
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