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September 22, 2005

9/11 Commission asked generals about Able Danger

The latest character assassination attempt by the 9/11 Hit Commission - with an entire section entitled "Memories are Faulty" - unwittingly reveals some important new details:

In the Department of Defense, the 9/11 Commission interviewed General Schoomaker, who was Commander of the Special Operations Command at the time Able Danger was created. The Commission interviewed General Hugh Shelton, who was Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Scott Fry and General Gregory Newbold, successive directors of operations for the Joint Staff. The Commission interviewed Brian Sheridan, the Assistant Secretary for Special Operatoins and Low Intensity Conflict (SOLIC) during the period Able Danger was in existence; as well as several other senior and mid-level managers in SOLIC. Despite direct questions for any information relevant to the 9/11 attacks, they mentioned nothing about a chart. They mentioned nothing about identifying Mohamed Atta, even in response to questions about the Able Danger program.

In other words, while they never asked these military officers if Able Danger had identified Mohamed Atta or presumably any of the other hijackers, they did ask them specifically about Able Danger. Which begs the question: What did the 9/11 Commission ask all these people about Able Danger and what was their response?

Maybe this staff statement is a hint?

Though plans were not executed, the military continued to assess and update target lists regularly in case the military was asked to strike. Plans largely centered on cruise missile and manned aircraft strike options, and were updated and refined continuously through March 2001....

In late 1999, the military engaged in substantial preparations in anticipation of possible terrorist attacks around the Millennium. The Joint Chiefs of Staff developed a plan to react as rapidly as possible to an al Qaeda strike anywhere in the world. The Pentagon
was also prepared to provide assistance within the United States to other federal agencies in response to an act or threatened act of terrorism.

In the summer of 2000, the Joint Chiefs of Staff refined its list of strikes and special operations possibilities to a set of thirteen options within the Operation Infinite Resolve plan. Planning by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and CENTCOM also focused primarily on the
development of the Predator unmanned aerial vehicle for the purposes of intelligence collection and targeting of Bin Ladin and al Qaeda leaders....

The new team at the Pentagon did not push for a response for the Cole, according to Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and Paul Wolfowitz, his deputy. Wolfowitz told us that by the time the new administration was in place, the Cole incident was “stale.” The 1998 cruise missiles strikes showed UBL and al Qaeda that they had nothing to fear from a U.S. response, Wolfowitz said. For his part, Rumsfeld also thought too much time had passed. He worked on the force protection recommendations developed in the aftermath of the U.S.S. Cole attack, not response options....

On February 8, General Shelton briefed Secretary Rumsfeld on the Operation Infinite Resolve plan, including the range of options and CENTCOM’s new phased campaign plan. These plans were periodically
updated during the ensuing months. Brian Sheridan—the outgoing Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (SOLIC), the key counterterrorism policy office in DOD—never briefed Rumsfeld. Lower-level SOLIC officials in the Office of the Secretary of Defense told us that they thought the new team was focused on other issues and was not especially interested in their counterterrorism agenda. Undersecretary Feith told the Commission that when he arrived at the Pentagon in July 2001, Rumsfeld asked him to focus his attention on working with the Russians on agreements to dissolve the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and preparing a new nuclear arms control pact. Traditionally, the primary DOD official responsible for counterterrorism policy had been the assistant secretary of defense for SOLIC. The outgoing assistant secretary left on January 20, 2001, and had not been replaced when the Pentagon was hit on September 11....

General Pete Schoomaker, the chief of staff of the U.S. Army and former Commander of the U.S. Special Operations Command, said that if the Special Operations Command had been a supported command before 9/11, he would have had the al Qaeda mission rather than deferring to CENTCOM’s lead. Schoomaker said he spoke to Secretary Cohen and General Shelton about this proposal. It was not adopted.

Posted by Mike at September 22, 2005 12:03 PM

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