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August 30, 2005

Even more Able Danger transcripts

Wow, Matthews is the first mainstream interview I've seen of Shaffer and it was a good one. Chris even mixed in some pop culture cues. Anyway, I have to admit I am curious who National Geographic talked to in order to get this story. Someone who is still at MacDill now?

“AT THIS AIR FORCE BASE IN TAMPA (Picture of Entrance Gate to MacDill Air Force Base), MEMBERS OF THE U.S. ARMY SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND ARE REVIEWING AN UNUSUAL CHART THAT REPORTEDLY IDENTIFIES BOTH ATTA (picture ID of Atta shown) AND AL-SHEHHI (picture ID of Al-Shehhi shown) AS LIKELY MEMBERS OF AN AL-QAEDA TERROR CELL OPERATING WITHIN THE U.S. THE OFFICIALS DECIDE THEY CANNOT PASS THIS INFORMATION ALONG TO THE FBI, IN PART BECAUSE THE MEN ARE HOLDING VALID U.S. VISAS AND MAY BE OFF LIMITS FROM INTELLIGENCE GATHERING BY THE MILITARY.”

Here's the segment from Chris Matthews on 8/26:

MATTHEWS: Some people in military intelligence say they knew about al Qaeda threats way before 9/11, but could not share the info with the FBI. Who was holding them back?
When HARDBALL returns.
(COMMERCIAL BREAK)
MATTHEWS: Welcome back to HARDBALL.
Two defense officers say that a military intelligence unit known as Able Danger identified Mohamed Atta and three other hijackers as potential al Qaeda threats more than a year before 9/11, but military lawyers prevented them from sharing this information with the FBI. Is the Pentagon to blame, then, for failing to prevent 9/11?
Lieutenant Colonel Anthony Shaffer was the first to come forward with his information. He served as the liaison officer between the Able Danger unit and the Defense Intelligence Agency. And Mark Zaid is his attorney.
Colonel, let me ask you this. In real simple terms, could 9/11 have been prevent by the information your unit had in its possession?
LT. COL. ANTHONY SHAFFER, FORMER ARMY INTELLIGENCE OFFICER: There‘s no way to tell if that could have happened or not. But I do believe that, had we been able to pass the information to the FBI, it would have given us a fighting chance. That‘s the best I can describe it.
MATTHEWS: Tell me how you learned about Mohamed Atta.
SHAFFER: This information...
MATTHEWS: And when.
SHAFFER: We found out about Mohamed Atta by his links, essentially, to put in it simple layman‘s term, profiling, using open-source data, regarding the travel and association of certain Muslim men and certain radical clerics. And this was done through open Internet completely by J.D. Smith. He came forward today.
There‘s—he is now on the record talking about exactly how he did this using advanced data tools, data mining, purchasing of data off the Internet through brokers, and then using multiple analytical tools to refute or confirm links. Again, this was a six-month process to come up with this information.
MATTHEWS: What was it that identified him as a terrorist, though?
SHAFFER: Describing him as a—he was found to be directly linked to radical Muslim clerics.
MATTHEWS: But he had no rap sheet, did he?
SHAFFER: No, he did not. And that was one of the things that was—the beauties of this whole technology. We were able to find these guys and their affiliations and associations a year before 9/11. Nobody else seems to have found this information.
MATTHEWS: Is there a formula—because this sounds like “Minority Report” with Tom Cruise, the movie—where you can predict a crime is going to happen based upon information?
SHAFFER: That was one of the keys of the way...
MATTHEWS: Do you believe you can?
SHAFFER: They were using the criteria of the World Trade Center one bomber.
As you recall, in ‘93, the World Trade Center one—was bombed. They took like eight points of data out of—which was common to all those individuals, take that data then, bounce it off the larger database, looking for profiles which meet up with the original set. That‘s how we found the linkage. That, plus the association of Atta and these other individuals with the radical clerics who were traveling and against the—for better or for worse. The Muslim clerics were being used as command-and-control of that operation.
MATTHEWS: Again using the “Minority Report” parallel, if you know someone is going to commit a crime, why don‘t you tell law enforcement officials?
SHAFFER: We attempted to do that. And that‘s one of the issues...
MATTHEWS: How hard? How hard did you try?
SHAFFER: I can‘t tell you. We tried as—to the point of where we thought this was the most important thing. There was no...
MATTHEWS: What‘s to stop you from dropping the dime on Mohamed Atta if you think the guy looks suspicious, just going to the nearest phone, call up and say, here‘s a tip? This guy, Mohamed Atta, is a dangerous man. He fits the pattern, the profile, of a terrorist. And we‘re afraid he is going to strike.
SHAFFER: He wasn‘t the only one that we discovered...
MATTHEWS: How many were in that category?
SHAFFER: There were probably about eight total that we had suspicion of.
MATTHEWS: Well, Why not do eight people like that? That‘ where—that‘s not a big chunk of people.
(CROSSTALK)
SHAFFER: Because that was where the Able Danger operations officer approached me and said, we have these individuals the lawyers have told us we can‘t look at we have to do something about.
That‘s where I came in to it, because I had a relationship with the FBI running a similar operation. So, I tried to broker meetings between the Able Danger individuals in Tampa and the FBI. That‘s where it went wrong. That‘s where we were stopped from providing the information.
MATTHEWS: Mark, what law prevents your client from telling his counterparts at the FBI that there‘s a dangerous guy out there that might blow up some things?
MARK ZAID, ATTORNEY FOR ANTHONY SHAFFER: Well, apparently, the concern within the military, similar to what was seen with the Justice Department wall, was that the military could not conduct intelligence operations or gathering of information on U.S. citizens or even U.S. person, meaning individuals here in the United States, foreigners, but who were lawfully here, as most or some of the hijackers were.
MATTHEWS: Where did that law come from, or rule?
ZAID: I‘m not entirely clear on that.
MATTHEWS: I mean, why do we collect intelligence information if we‘re not going to use it?
ZAID: Well, that‘s a good question.
I mean, part of it may come back in 19th century with Posse Comitatus and the military is not allowed to do law enforcement operations.
(CROSSTALK)
MATTHEWS: I could give you a list of places to go buy Christmas trees, with the idea that you go buy a Christmas tree. Why would you collect data on locating bad guys if you are not going to pick them up?
ZAID: Well, that was the question.
And there was a division within the military as to what they can do and how long they can do it. And that‘s why the program was shut down. Most—a lot of these questions should be directed at the Army, as to why was the program shut down in early 2001, when it was producing the results that it did?
MATTHEWS: You‘re not the only one speaking out. Navy Captain Scott Philpott, is he saying the same thing you are?
SHAFFER: He has gone on the record backing up everything that‘s been said about him knowing about Atta and what we were doing regarding Able Danger, yes.
ZAID: It‘s not even Philpott.
We have now—there‘s been several have gone on the record. But having talked to other team members and who have also talked to other team members, there are now up to at least a dozen team members who are supportive...
(CROSSTALK)
MATTHEWS: Why are the two chairman of the 9/11 Commission denying the value of what you‘re saying?
SHAFFER: I think Richard Ben-Veniste said it the best the other day during an interview on CNBC on the Donny Deutsch show.
MATTHEWS: Yes.
SHAFFER: When Donny Deutsch asked him, why is it you never checked out, as the commissioners, Colonel Shaffer‘s story? His answer was very telling. He said, we had no technology or ability to actually check on what the colonel was telling us. We had—“The technology to do so no longer exists”—unquote.
So, that was the key. The technology we used to get this information does not exist at the time they were doing the report, the 9/11 Commission research, nor does it exist now. So, that is the key. They couldn‘t verify what we were saying.
ZAID: Chris, the problem is, the Defense Department didn‘t give them the data that was necessary. And we now know that the Army destroyed a large amount of that data in 2001. And that‘s another question that needs to be asked. Why?
MATTHEWS: OK. Thank you.
Nine-Eleven Commissioner Thomas Kean is one of those people that is denying the value of what you‘re saying right here.
SHAFFER: Well, I—sir, I can only tell you what I know and what I talked to the 9/11 Commission about. And how an offensive operation aimed at looking at al Qaeda two years in advance of 9/11 is somehow not historically relevant, I don‘t understand.
MATTHEWS: So, you knew the name Mohamed Atta? You knew the guy was dangerous?
SHAFFER: We knew that he was linked to radical Muslim clerics and he was of concern, by the fact that the lawyers told us we couldn‘t even do intelligence collection against him, yes.
(CROSSTALK)
MATTHEWS: I want to come back and talk more about this. I think everybody has got to figure out watching this show how we can pick people ahead of time, because I was stunned.
The day of 9/11, the day after, all of a sudden, within 24 hours, I see pictures in the newspapers of every guy who did it. Where did those pictures come from?
SHAFFER: Exactly.
MATTHEWS: How did we know all that so fast? Usual suspects, obviously.
More with Anthony Shaffer and Mark Zaid when we return.
And a reminder: The political debate is 24/7 here at Hardblogger, our political blog Web site. Follow all the action on the hottest political stories each day. Just go to our Web site, HARDBALL.MSNBC.com.
This is HARDBALL on MSNBC.
(COMMERCIAL BREAK)
MATTHEWS: We are back with Lieutenant Colonel Anthony Shaffer, who says that a military team had linked Mohamed Atta to an al Qaeda cell more than a year before 9/11. We are also joined by his lawyer, Mark Zaid.
Is the federal government—I mean, you are going to be asked this the rest of your life, my friend, Lieutenant Colonel. You‘re going to be asked the rest of your life, did we blow it?
SHAFFER: I think we did blow it.
I mean, any time you have information which is critical to any given military target and somehow it is not used properly, you have blown it. I mean, there‘s no—there‘s no way—there‘s no way too put too fine a point on it.
The question is now, how do we learn from this and what else did the 9/11 Commission miss? And how do we go back and try to find those other little misses of information? And one of the things I need to add here, Chris, is that, like you pointed out, the “Minority Report” paradigm here. These guys, these terrorists live in the real world. If you recall, the London bombing, the day that—weeks before the London bombing, there‘s a picture of these guys out on a white-water rafting trip together.
That—I swear, I believe in my heart of hearts, that was their final planning meeting. That means that they live in the real world. What we need to do is find out through the links who they associate with and how those links can be traced back to what they‘re doing. Unlike you and I, who have patterns in our life, they have a different pattern. And that pattern is detectable. And I think that‘s where we need to go with this.
MATTHEWS: so, you believe we can get enough basic hard facts on people that might be on a long list of—a watch list—to narrow down to those who have conducted themselves in a certain way that fits the pattern of people about to commit terrorism?
SHAFFER: Not even a watch list.
MATTHEWS: And we can do it?
SHAFFER: Not even a watch list. We‘re talking about, in some cases with the London bombers, citizens who were totally above board, looked perfectly normal.
MATTHEWS: Yes.
SHAFFER: There‘s—but there was a pattern there.
MATTHEWS: I love this with this formula. Don‘t give it away, though.
(CROSSTALK)
MATTHEWS: Keep that formula to yourself.
(CROSSTALK)
MATTHEWS: Because they might figure it out and operate differently.
But...
(CROSSTALK)
SHAFFER: Right.
MATTHEWS: It sounds like good standard police work. Did you notice anything different?
SHAFFER: Yes.
MATTHEWS: People fit patterns. People go to neighborhoods they don‘t normally go to. Look for them as the killer.
(CROSSTALK)
MATTHEWS: Let me ask you this.
What—just personally, when you started to see this grim looking picture of Mohamed Atta flashed all over the TV screen, all over the newspapers, having picked him up as one of your eight suspects, what did you think?
SHAFFER: I was shocked, just like, you know...
(CROSSTALK)
MATTHEWS: You might have said, we were right?
SHAFFER: We were going down the right path. And that was my concern.
And, as a matter of fact, my colleagues and I got together. As a matter of fact, one of my former investigators came forward recently and said, I remember you talking to me about this a week after 9/11.
MATTHEWS: Yes.
SHAFFER: We all realized that we had these guys.
And then we started asking some questions to ourselves. Why was Able Danger, why was this whole technology piece turned off four months before the 9/11 attacks? In the spring of 2001, it was dismantled, all, completely...
(CROSSTALK)
MATTHEWS: You know what? It sounds like me watching the CIA leak case. I know all these people involved, all the suspects. And when their names start popping up in the reports, I go, yes, I figured that was one of them.
(LAUGHTER)
MATTHEWS: But you‘re much closer to a horror story, because you, the rest of your life, will know that you could have, couldn‘t you, have gone nuts when you saw Mohamed Atta‘s face?
SHAFFER: We...
MATTHEWS: And said, this guy is really dangerous. I don‘t care how many rules I break. I‘m going to stop him.
SHAFFER: We didn‘t know—Chris, in our defense, we did not know al Qaeda was such a—that level of threat before 9/11. We did not.
MATTHEWS: You didn‘t know they would knock—tried to knock down the World Trade Center in ‘93?
SHAFFER: We did. I‘m not saying we didn‘t know that.
(CROSSTALK)
MATTHEWS: And only came within a few cinder blocks of doing it?
SHAFFER: That‘s why Able Danger was created. And, again, look at the title, Able Danger. There was a knowledge that these guys were dangerous. The Cole Attack happened after Able Danger started.
MATTHEWS: OK.
Quick, just to finish up , because everybody is curious about this.
(CROSSTALK)
MATTHEWS: This is an iconic event in our history.
Of those eight people that you fingered as possible dangers based on a pattern of behaviors...
SHAFFER: Right.
MATTHEWS: ... set behaviors that you‘ve identified as indicative of what‘s coming in this guy, how many of them were involved, three?
SHAFFER: There was a total of four, by my recollection.
MATTHEWS: So, you had four out of eight.
SHAFFER: That was—we had four of the group.
MATTHEWS: That‘s batting .500.
SHAFFER: And we believe that, had that information—the fact that
these guys were linked to al Qaeda leadership, we think that information
may have been useful to the FBI
(CROSSTALK)
MATTHEWS: You think, if you had had a perfect relations with the FBI
· tell me the law here, Mark. If the colonel had called up the FBI or his
· through the right channels, pick up these guys. These guys are dangerous. We have got a set of information about them that says these guys are about to pull something big. Would the law have been able to pick them up?

ZAID: My understanding of the preclusion that the military had, it would have been problematic from a law enforcement standpoint. Also understand...
MATTHEWS: There‘s no probable cause. There‘s no reason to believe...
(CROSSTALK)
ZAID: They did not have that type of data.
MATTHEWS: You can‘t use prior restraint in the law?
(CROSSTALK)
ZAID: They only had links. They had associations that this person was hanging out with this person, was shopping at this place, was attending this mosque, this church, whatever.
(CROSSTALK)
ZAID: They only had that type of links, which, in these type of operations, as we now know publicly from how al Qaeda operated, that was how they conducted their planning.
Now, the real grave concern is, they identified, OK, three or four of them. What happened to the other people on the list? Just because they weren‘t participating in 9/11, are they planning something now? If they identified 50 percent of them at that time, where is the data to look at these people on the list now?
(CROSSTALK)
MATTHEWS: Thank you, Colonel.
Thank you, Mark Zaid.
Join us again on Monday night at 7:00 Eastern for more HARDBALL. We will talk to former Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott on how the Republicans are preparing to support Judge Roberts during his confirmation hearings, also about Trent‘s new book. Also, next week, comedian and TV host Bill Maher.
Up next, “COUNTDOWN WITH KEITH OLBERMANN,” hosted tonight by my friend Chris Jansing, and more on the damage left by Hurricane Katrina.

Posted by Mike at August 30, 2005 10:48 PM

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